ringct: the commitment mask is now deterministic

saves space in the tx and is safe

Found by knaccc
This commit is contained in:
moneromooo-monero 2019-01-08 16:05:18 +00:00
parent 99d946e619
commit 7d37598158
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 686F07454D6CEFC3
7 changed files with 55 additions and 63 deletions

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@ -249,15 +249,18 @@ namespace boost
template <class Archive> template <class Archive>
inline void serialize(Archive &a, rct::ecdhTuple &x, const boost::serialization::version_type ver) inline void serialize(Archive &a, rct::ecdhTuple &x, const boost::serialization::version_type ver)
{ {
a & x.mask;
if (ver < 1) if (ver < 1)
{ {
a & x.mask;
a & x.amount; a & x.amount;
return; return;
} }
crypto::hash8 &amount = (crypto::hash8&)x.amount; crypto::hash8 &amount = (crypto::hash8&)x.amount;
if (!Archive::is_saving::value) if (!Archive::is_saving::value)
{
memset(&x.mask, 0, sizeof(x.mask));
memset(&x.amount, 0, sizeof(x.amount)); memset(&x.amount, 0, sizeof(x.amount));
}
a & amount; a & amount;
// a & x.senderPk; // not serialized, as we do not use it in monero currently // a & x.senderPk; // not serialized, as we do not use it in monero currently
} }

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@ -684,24 +684,44 @@ namespace rct {
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i) for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
v.bytes[i] ^= k.bytes[i]; v.bytes[i] ^= k.bytes[i];
} }
void ecdhEncode(ecdhTuple & unmasked, const key & sharedSec, bool short_amount) { key genCommitmentMask(const key &sk)
{
char data[15 + sizeof(key)];
memcpy(data, "commitment_mask", 15);
memcpy(data + 15, &sk, sizeof(sk));
key scalar;
hash_to_scalar(scalar, data, sizeof(data));
return scalar;
}
void ecdhEncode(ecdhTuple & unmasked, const key & sharedSec, bool v2) {
//encode
if (v2)
{
unmasked.mask = zero();
xor8(unmasked.amount, ecdhHash(sharedSec));
}
else
{
key sharedSec1 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec); key sharedSec1 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec);
key sharedSec2 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec1); key sharedSec2 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec1);
//encode
sc_add(unmasked.mask.bytes, unmasked.mask.bytes, sharedSec1.bytes); sc_add(unmasked.mask.bytes, unmasked.mask.bytes, sharedSec1.bytes);
if (short_amount)
xor8(unmasked.amount, ecdhHash(sharedSec));
else
sc_add(unmasked.amount.bytes, unmasked.amount.bytes, sharedSec2.bytes); sc_add(unmasked.amount.bytes, unmasked.amount.bytes, sharedSec2.bytes);
} }
void ecdhDecode(ecdhTuple & masked, const key & sharedSec, bool short_amount) { }
void ecdhDecode(ecdhTuple & masked, const key & sharedSec, bool v2) {
//decode
if (v2)
{
masked.mask = genCommitmentMask(sharedSec);
xor8(masked.amount, ecdhHash(sharedSec));
}
else
{
key sharedSec1 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec); key sharedSec1 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec);
key sharedSec2 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec1); key sharedSec2 = hash_to_scalar(sharedSec1);
//decode
sc_sub(masked.mask.bytes, masked.mask.bytes, sharedSec1.bytes); sc_sub(masked.mask.bytes, masked.mask.bytes, sharedSec1.bytes);
if (short_amount)
xor8(masked.amount, ecdhHash(sharedSec));
else
sc_sub(masked.amount.bytes, masked.amount.bytes, sharedSec2.bytes); sc_sub(masked.amount.bytes, masked.amount.bytes, sharedSec2.bytes);
} }
}
} }

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@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ namespace rct {
//Elliptic Curve Diffie Helman: encodes and decodes the amount b and mask a //Elliptic Curve Diffie Helman: encodes and decodes the amount b and mask a
// where C= aG + bH // where C= aG + bH
void ecdhEncode(ecdhTuple & unmasked, const key & sharedSec, bool short_amount); key genCommitmentMask(const key &sk);
void ecdhDecode(ecdhTuple & masked, const key & sharedSec, bool short_amount); void ecdhEncode(ecdhTuple & unmasked, const key & sharedSec, bool v2);
void ecdhDecode(ecdhTuple & masked, const key & sharedSec, bool v2);
} }
#endif /* RCTOPS_H */ #endif /* RCTOPS_H */

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@ -79,9 +79,12 @@ namespace
} }
namespace rct { namespace rct {
Bulletproof proveRangeBulletproof(keyV &C, keyV &masks, const std::vector<uint64_t> &amounts) Bulletproof proveRangeBulletproof(keyV &C, keyV &masks, const std::vector<uint64_t> &amounts, epee::span<const key> sk)
{ {
masks = rct::skvGen(amounts.size()); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == sk.size(), "Invalid amounts/sk sizes");
masks.resize(amounts.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < masks.size(); ++i)
masks[i] = genCommitmentMask(sk[i]);
Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, masks); Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, masks);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(proof.V.size() == amounts.size(), "V does not have the expected size"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(proof.V.size() == amounts.size(), "V does not have the expected size");
C = proof.V; C = proof.V;
@ -803,7 +806,8 @@ namespace rct {
} }
else else
{ {
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, outamounts)); const epee::span<const key> keys{&amount_keys[0], amount_keys.size()};
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, outamounts, keys));
#ifdef DBG #ifdef DBG
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
#endif #endif
@ -831,7 +835,8 @@ namespace rct {
} }
else else
{ {
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts)); const epee::span<const key> keys{&amount_keys[amounts_proved], batch_size};
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts, keys));
#ifdef DBG #ifdef DBG
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
#endif #endif

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@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ namespace rct {
key senderPk; key senderPk;
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT() BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(mask) FIELD(mask) // not saved from v2 BPs
FIELD(amount) FIELD(amount)
// FIELD(senderPk) // not serialized, as we do not use it in monero currently // FIELD(senderPk) // not serialized, as we do not use it in monero currently
END_SERIALIZE() END_SERIALIZE()
@ -286,7 +286,6 @@ namespace rct {
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof2) if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof2)
{ {
ar.begin_object(); ar.begin_object();
FIELD_N("mask", ecdhInfo[i].mask);
if (!typename Archive<W>::is_saving()) if (!typename Archive<W>::is_saving())
memset(ecdhInfo[i].amount.bytes, 0, sizeof(ecdhInfo[i].amount.bytes)); memset(ecdhInfo[i].amount.bytes, 0, sizeof(ecdhInfo[i].amount.bytes));
crypto::hash8 &amount = (crypto::hash8&)ecdhInfo[i].amount; crypto::hash8 &amount = (crypto::hash8&)ecdhInfo[i].amount;

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@ -130,18 +130,3 @@ TEST(device, ecdh32)
ASSERT_EQ(tuple2.senderPk, tuple.senderPk); ASSERT_EQ(tuple2.senderPk, tuple.senderPk);
} }
TEST(device, ecdh8)
{
hw::core::device_default dev;
rct::ecdhTuple tuple, tuple2;
rct::key key = rct::skGen();
tuple.mask = rct::skGen();
tuple.amount = rct::skGen();
tuple.senderPk = rct::pkGen();
tuple2 = tuple;
dev.ecdhEncode(tuple, key, true);
dev.ecdhDecode(tuple, key, true);
ASSERT_EQ(tuple2.mask, tuple.mask);
ASSERT_EQ(tuple2.amount, tuple.amount);
ASSERT_EQ(tuple2.senderPk, tuple.senderPk);
}

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@ -831,27 +831,6 @@ TEST(ringct, HPow2)
static const xmr_amount test_amounts[]={0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10000, 10000000000000000000ull, 10203040506070809000ull, 123456789123456789}; static const xmr_amount test_amounts[]={0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10000, 10000000000000000000ull, 10203040506070809000ull, 123456789123456789};
TEST(ringct, ecdh_roundtrip)
{
key k;
ecdhTuple t0, t1;
for (auto amount: test_amounts) {
skGen(k);
t0.mask = skGen();
t0.amount = d2h(amount);
t1 = t0;
ecdhEncode(t1, k, true);
ecdhDecode(t1, k, true);
ASSERT_TRUE(t0.mask == t1.mask);
ASSERT_TRUE(equalKeys(t0.mask, t1.mask));
ASSERT_TRUE(t0.amount == t1.amount);
ASSERT_TRUE(equalKeys(t0.amount, t1.amount));
}
}
TEST(ringct, d2h) TEST(ringct, d2h)
{ {
key k, P1; key k, P1;